

25X1
25X1
25X1

Comirex M-74

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

TOP SECRET

COMIREX-M-74

26 June 1969

Special Addendum

COMIREX-M-74 Special Addendum

In view of the fact that no COMIREX meeting was held on 3 July 1969, a special addendum is published to cover the reports on aircraft activities of the Far East and Cuba.

Report on Aircraft Activities--Far East

25X1

1. Action on two priority South China/North Vietnam requirements is reported below:

a. Surveillance coverage was reported on Lines of Communications (LOC) pertinent to the introduction of Chinese forces into North Vietnam (see COMOR-D-25/207, 4 March 1966). The number of LOC priority targets in South China and North Vietnam remains at 352. For the period 26 June - 2 July 1969, surveillance coverage was reported on four priority targets in North Vietnam. The specific targets are identified by underlining in Tab A.

b. Coverage of North Vietnam to detect the possible introduction or deployment of offensive missile systems (see COMOR-D-25/200, 23 May 1967, and COMIREX-D-25.3/2, 20 November 1967) is shown on the grid map at Tab B for the period 19-25 June 1969. One BUMPY ACTION mission flown during this time period and reported as successful has not been included.

Report on Aircraft Activities--Cuba

25X1

2. For the 56-day period beginning 8 May 1969, six OLD HEAD missions were flown over Cuba and provided 83.2 percent coverage of the area. During this period 125 of the 190 targets in Cuba were covered completely on cloud-free photography, not including the most recent mission flown on 28 June.

25X1A

GROUP 1. EXCLUDED FROM
AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

TOP SECRET

25X1

25X1A

25X1D

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0


Next 10 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0


High Resolution Coverage of North Vietnam

(80% or more cloud-free)

Date of Report: 2 July 1969 Tab B




25X1A
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1



Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

TOP SECRET



COMIREX-M-74
26 June 1969

25X1A

COMMITTEE ON IMAGERY REQUIREMENTS AND EXPLOITATION

COMIREX-M-74
26 June 1969

*Approved by
COMIREX 10 July 69
COMIREX-M-74*

The following is an index of the Minutes of the 26 June 1969
COMIREX meeting:

Page 5 Special Briefing - Intelligence Gained From Peripheral
CHURCHDOOR Missions

Section I (Approval of Minutes, Briefings, and Reports on Operations)

Page 6 Approval of Minutes

Page 6 Operational Briefing--Satellite
6 Report on Aircraft Activities--Far East
9 Report on Aircraft Activities--Cuba

Section II (NPIC Report)

Page 12 Special Report on

25X1A

Section III (Subcommittee and Working Group Reports)

Page 15 Report from Imagery Collection Requirements
Subcommittee

Section IV (Action Items)


Page 16 NRO Report on CORONA Scheduling
and Availability

25X1
NRO

25X1A
25X1A

Page 19 Handling of SR-71 Photography of North Korea

Page 20 Study of Near-Real-Time Imagery Satellite System:
Its Impact on Intelligence Products and Processes



Copy 6 of 66

25X1A
25X1A

25X1
25X1


GROUP 1 - EXCLUDED FROM
AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

TOP SECRET


25X1A
25X1A

25X1A
25X1
25X1



Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

~~TOP SECRET~~



COMIREX-M-74
26 June 1969

25X1A

Section V (Status of Recent COMIREX Papers)

- Page 22 Approval of FY 1970 Basic Requirements
(COMIREX-D-31.4-70/1, COMIREX-D-31.4-70/2,
COMIREX-D-31.4-70/3, COMIREX-D-31.4-70/4,
COMIREX-D-31.4-70/5, and COMIREX-D-31.4-70/6)
and Report on Progress in Program
- Page 23 COMIREX Resource Information Report, Third
Quarter FY 1969, Program for Planning Exploitation
FY 1971-1975 (COMIREX-D-31.5/3 and COMIREX-M-73,
page 18, paragraph 3)

Section VI (Other Business)


- Page 24 Comments From the Retiring Chairman
- Page 25 Sanitization of KH-4 for Contingency Planning
(COMIREX-D-2.7/7)

25X1A



Tabs

- Page 27 Tab B - High Resolution Coverage of North Vietnam,
12-18 June 1969
- Page 28 Tab C - Progress Report on FY 1970 Basic Requirements
by NTP Functional Area





25X1A

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

~~TOP SECRET~~




25X1A
25X1A

25X1

25X1A


Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

25X1A
25X1
25X1



Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

TOP SECRET



COMIREX-M-74
26 June 1969

25X1A

Special Briefing

Intelligence Gained From Peripheral CHURCHDOOR Missions

25X1A

1. [redacted] reported that since December 1967 33 peripheral missions have been programmed. Of these, ten flew, one was lost, and nine returned safely. [redacted] then reported that, concentrating on 1969, three missions were flown. He summarized the take as follows:

25X1

25X1A


a. The 8 April mission observed 30 targets, five of which could be read out.

b. The mission on 7 May returned photography of generally poor quality and interpretability. Two naval facilities were observed, including a new probable facility southwest of Takushan and some useful information was developed on these two facilities. There was also some photography of the Shanghai SAWRF and the four SAWRF associated coastal defense sites.

c. 28 May returned better detail on the Shanghai SAWRF setup. This gave us our first chance to provide detailed photography of a SAWRF setup at the SECRET level. Good coverage of Tai Shan Airfield indicates that the new East/West runway or taxiway may be tunneling into the hills.

2. Although these three missions can hardly be classified as highly productive, the significant targets mentioned above do represent important information for the intelligence community, at what would appear to be very little risk. In reply to a question from [redacted] advised that the 111-B (H) camera has been used on all missions.

25X1A




25X1A

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0


TOP SECRET



25X1A
25X1A


25X1

25X1A
25X1A



Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

TOP SECRET




COMIREX-M-74
26 June 1969

25X1
25X1A

Section I (Approval of Minutes, Briefings, and Reports on Operations)

Approval of Minutes



25X1
25X1A

1. COMIREX-M-73 were approved without change.


Operational Briefing--Satellite



25X1A

2. [Redacted] reported satellite operations and scheduling as shown on page 11.

Report on Aircraft Activities--Far East




25X1A

3. There were no IDEALIST/TACKLE or FOOD FAIR activities to report. [Redacted] reported one GIANT SCALE mission during the period 6-26 June as follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>MISSION NO.</u>	<u>AREAS/TARGETS</u>	<u>RESULTS</u>
13 Jun	GS155	Yen Bai Complex, Yen Bai AF, Kep Afld, Kep RR Yd, Hon Gai Port Fac, Cam Pha Port Fac, Rte Seg 1A, 7, 8, 15, RR Seg 1, 9	Fair

4. The DIA member reported that there had been a flurry of BUMPY ACTION activities. Twenty-two missions out of 32 flown during the period 6-26 June were successful, while nine were lost and one aborted. All but three of the BUMPY ACTION missions were low. Of the high missions, one was successful, one lost, and one aborted. Details are given on pages 7 and 8.





25X1
25X1A

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

TOP SECRET



25X1A
25X1A

25X1

25X1A
25X1

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

TOP SECRET

COMIREX-M-74
26 June 1969

25X1
25X1A

BUMPY ACTION ACTIVITIES

<u>DATE</u>	<u>MISSION NO.</u>	<u>AREAS/TARGETS</u>	<u>RESULTS</u>
7 Jun	Q548/Q144 (Low)	SAM 263, Bac Mai Afld, Hanoi Port Fac, Yen Vien RR Yd	Lost
7 Jun	Q538/Q145 (Low)	WW 19A, Bai Thuong Afld	MARS
8 Jun	Q882NB/Q147 (Low-nite)	Hanoi Port Fac, Gia Lam Afld	MARS
9 Jun	Q530/Q148 (Low)	Nam Dinh TPP, Phu Ly-Hanoi RR, Bac Mai Afld, Yen Vien RR Yd, Hanoi Radar SA-2 Msl Cont Sys	Lost
9 Jun	Q549A/Q149 (Low)	Vinh Afld, POL Pipeline, RR 7, Dong Hoi Afld, Rte 1A, Dong Hoi TSP	MARS
10 Jun	Q544/Q150 (Low)	Cam Pha Port Fac, Kep RR Yd, Kep Afld, Kiep Hoa Afld	Lost
10 Jun	Q531/Q151 (Low)	Kien An Afld, Haiphong Port Fac	MARS
11 Jun	Q508B/Q153 (Low)	Yen Vien RR Yd, Gia Lam Afld, Bac Mai Afld, Hanoi Port Fac, Nam Dinh TPP, Nam Dinh TSP	MARS
13 Jun	Q541/Q158 (Low)	Haiphong Port Fac, Cat Bi Afld	MARS
13 Jun	Q516A/Q159 (Low)	Rtes 100, 1A and RR, Nam Dinh TSP, Thanh Hoa TSP	Lost
14 Jun	Q548/Q160 (Low)	SAM 263, Bac Mai Afld, Yen Vien RR Yd, Hanoi Port Fac	MARS
14 Jun	Q523/Q161 (Low)	Nam Dinh TPP, RR 4, Phu Ly RR Yd, Bai Thuong Afld	MARS
15 Jun	Q252/Q162 (High)	DMZ, Mu Gia Pass, Rte 15, Rte 1A, Vinh Complex, Bai Thuong Afld	Abort (MARS)

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

TOP SECRET

25X1A

25X1A
25X1A

25X1

25X1A
25X1

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

TOP SECRET

COMIREX-M-74
26 June 1969

25X1
25X1A

<u>DATE</u>	<u>MISSION NO.</u>	<u>AREAS/TARGETS</u>	<u>RESULTS</u>
15 Jun	Q553/Q163 (Low)	Kien An Afld, Haiphong Nav Base	MARS
17 Jun	Q551/Q167 (Low)	Haiphong Port Fac, Segs RR 3 and 4, Rte 1A	MARS
18 Jun	Q501/Q168 (Low)	Vinh Afld, Vinh Complex, Rte 1A and RR, Dong Hoi	Lost
18 Jun	Q550/Q169 (Low)	An Khe Brks, Haiphong Port	MARS
19 Jun	Q503/Q170 (Low)	Rte 15, Vinh Son Complex	MARS
19 Jun	Q542/Q171 (Low)	Kien An Afld, Rte 1A, Rte 10	MARS
20 Jun	Q538/Q172 (Low)	WW 19A, Bai Thuong Afld	MARS
20 Jun	Q501/Q173 (Low)	Vinh Afld, Vinh Complex, Rte 1A & RR Dong Hoi	Lost
21 Jun	Q513A/Q174 (Low)	Hanoi Port Fac, Gia Lam Afld, Yen Vien RR Yds	MARS
21 Jun	Q554/Q175 (Low)	Xom Ap Lo Ammo Stor, PW Camp	Water Recovery
22 Jun	Q527/Q177 (Low)	SAM Site 73, Kep Afld, Kiep Hoa Afld	MARS
22 Jun	Q882NB/Q178 (Low-nite)	Hanoi Port Fac, Gia Lam Afld	MARS
23 Jun	Q511/Q179 (Low)	Kien An Afld, Cat Bi Afld	MARS
24 Jun	Q226/Q180 (High)	Hon NE Isle, Rte 1A & 101, Vinh Afld, Beach Seg from 1920N/1934N	MARS
24 Jun	Q526A/181 (Low)	SAM Site 73, Phuc Yen Afld, Hanoi Port Fac	Lost
25 Jun	Q528/Q182 (Low)	SAM Site 334/Hon Gai Port Fac, Port Wallut	MARS
25 Jun	Q516/Q183 (Low)	Rte 10 and 1A, Nam Dinh TSP, Nam Dinh RR, Thanh Hoa TSP	Water recovery

TOP SECRET

25X1A
25X1

25X1A
25X1A

25X1

25X1A
25X1

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

COMIREX-M-74
26 June 1969

25X1
25X1A

<u>DATE</u>	<u>MISSION NO.</u>	<u>AREAS/TARGETS</u>	<u>RESULTS</u>
26 Jun	Q229A/Q184 (High)	DMZ, Mu Gia Pass, Rte 15, Bai Thuong Afld	Lost
26 Jun	Q531/Q185 (Low)	Haiphong Port Fac, Kien An Afld	Lost

25X1A

5. [] reported that there had not been any surveillance coverage of the 352 LOC targets in South China and North Vietnam (See COMOR-D-25/207, 4 March 1966) during the period 19-25 June. Coverage of North Vietnam to detect the possible introduction or deployment of offensive missile systems (see COMOR-D-25/200, 23 May 1967, and COMIREX-D-25.3/2, 20 November 1967) is shown on the grid map at Tab B for the period 12-18 June 1969. No SSM activity was observed. One successful BUMPY ACTION mission flown during this period has not been included on the map.

Report on Aircraft Activities--Cuba

[]

25X1

25X1A

6. [] reported GLASS LAMP activity between 6-26 June as follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>MISSION NO.</u>	<u>RESULTS</u>
19 Jun	G086	Successful, 15.1% coverage
24 Jun	G087	Successful, 34.7% coverage
26 Jun	G088	Unknown


RECAP

<u>DATE</u>	<u>MISSION NO.</u>	<u>NET</u>	<u>CUMULATIVE</u>
19 Jun	G086	15.1%	26.8%
24 Jun	G087	34.7%	57.0%
26 Jun	G088	Unk	Unk

25X1A
25X1


25X1A
25X1A

25X1A
25X1
25X1



Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

TOP SECRET



COMIREX-M-74
26 June 1969


25X1A

25X1A

7. [redacted] reported that for the 56-day period beginning 1 May 1969 four GLASS LAMP missions were flown over Cuba and provided 57 percent coverage of the area. During this period 50 of the 180 targets in Cuba were covered completely on cloud-free photography. The two most recent missions, flown on 19 and 24 June, are not included in the above report of targets covered.



25X1

10



Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

TOP SECRET



~~25X1A~~

~~25X1A~~
25X1A

25X1


25X1D

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt


Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

25X1A
25X1



Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

TOP SECRET



COMIREX-M-74
26 June 1969

25X1
25X1A

Section III (Subcommittee and Working Group Reports)

Report from Imagery Collection Requirements Subcommittee

25X1A
25X1A

1. [redacted] reported that, pertinent to [redacted] paper, COMIREX-D-25.3/7, the ICRS members were briefed by [redacted], CIA/NED/OSI, on the CIA requirements for KH-4B Mission 1107 as it pertains to Communist China. He emphasized the value of low sun angle to obtain shadows which will aid in the search for the Chinese Communist impact craters, the need for near nadir photography of the suspected impact area, more opportunities for the rail search requirement for deployed MR/IRBM sites, and the use of SO 180 (infrared color) which could possibly answer questions on functions within nuclear installations. The NRO was requested to obtain information on four cases with inclinations of [redacted] /Subsequently, the [redacted] inclination was recommended which will allow for more accesses and longer shadows of objects in China because of the availability of ascending and descending passes. This orbit will give 100 percent access to all areas of interest world-wide except for 4 percent of the Soviet land mass above 75° North. The decision was made not to use SO 180 color film on this mission primarily because of poor resolution. [redacted]

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

2. Priority targets were submitted to DIA to enable the planning of SR-71 missions over North Korea.

TOP SECRET

25X1
25X1A


25X1

25X1A

25X1A

25X1


25X1A
25X1



Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

TOP SECRET

C



COMIREX-M-74
26 June 1969

25X1
25X1A

Section IV (Action Items)

NRO Report on CORONA [redacted] Scheduling and Availability
of UTB Film [redacted] [redacted]

25X1A
25X1
NRO 25X1A

1. In reply to a request made by the Chairman on
22 May (COMIREX-M-72, page 16, paragraphs 1-3), [redacted]
reported as follows on the question of the use of Ultra-Thin
Base film on Mission [redacted]

25X1A

25X1

The NRO has reviewed results of extensive tests
carried on by the CORONA Program Office. These test
results indicate that UTB can replace STB for Mission [redacted]
The above is based on the following conclusions:

25X1

a. There is no increase in possibility of
catastrophic failure in using UTB in place of STB.

b. There is a likelihood of some degradation
during the first two days of flight due to outgassing. This
effect on the overall mission may be reduced by selective
targeting during that period.

c. There is increased confidence that the overall
film quality will be comparable to, and possibly better than,
that of Mission [redacted]

25X1

d. If Mission [redacted] with UTB does not meet the
normal ground test performance specifications, this mission
will be replaced by Vehicle [redacted] with STB.


25X1

25X1

2. In answer to a question concerning when final decision
would be made on whether or not Mission [redacted] would be replaced by
Mission [redacted] [redacted] said that we should know by 15 August.

25X1

25X1A



25X1A

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

TOP SECRET

25X1A
25X1
25X1A

25X1

25X1A
25X1

[] Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

TOP SECRET

[]

COMIREX-M-74
26 June 1969

25X1
25X1A

25X1

3. With further reference to improving capability of the remaining CORONAs, the NRO consultant advised COMIREX that Solar Array Panels will be installed on all J-3 type missions, commencing with Mission [] to be launched in March 1970. The 100-lb. Solar Array Panel power source will replace four 125-lb. batteries, a net weight decrease of 400 lbs. As a result, []

25X1
NRO

[] This power source will also extend nominal mission life from 18 to 20 days. This will permit added operational flexibility, with increased accesses, increased probability of clear weather, and better film management.

25X1A

4. []

[]

25X1
NRO

25X1A

25X1A

5. The NRO Consultant next presented the following report on [] and on the ExCom decision not to order additional CORONA vehicles at this time:

25X1D

[]

[]

25X1A

25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1A
25X1A

25X1A

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

COMIREX-M-74
26 June 196925X1
25X1A

6. Mr. Smith continued the subject of CORONA scheduling by presenting the following search requirement satisfaction percentages which had been computed for three sets of options as shown:

	FY 69	FY 70			FY 71			FY 72		
	ACTUAL	*	**	***	*	**	***	*	**	***
		Jul	Jul		Jul	Jul		NONE	Jul	
	Aug									
	Sep	Sep			Sep					
			Oct			Oct			Oct	
	Nov	Nov			Nov					
	Dec		Dec			Dec				
		Jan			Jan					
	Feb		Feb			Feb				
	Mar	Mar			Mar					
	May	May	May		May	May				
No. of Msns.	7	6	5	5	6	5	5	0	2	2
Search Sat. (80% Req.)	73%	70%	63%	75%	75%	68%	80%	28%	42%	54%
One Failure	—	55%	48%	64%	63%	56%	69%	14%	22%	35%

* Present Schedule - STB at 100 NM, UTB at 85 NM

** 5-5-2 Schedule - STB at 100 NM only

*** 5-5-2 Schedule - STB at 100 NM, UTB at 100 NM
(STB for 1107 and 1052 only)

7. The Chairman questioned [] regarding the effect of using UTB film at the optimum altitude of 85 n.m. rather than at 100 n.m., as the above chart was calculated, and the rationale for going to 100 n.m. for UTB missions. The NRO Consultant said that the chart was prepared to show what satisfaction can be given at 100 n.m. because it provides for a great increase--13.7 million sq. n.m. as opposed to 9.6 million sq. n.m. at 85 n.m.--in overall coverage with only a modest degradation in resolution.

25X1A


TOP SECRET

25X1A

25X1A
25X1A


25X1A

25X1A
25X1
25X1



Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

TOP SECRET



COMIREX-M-74
26 June 1969

25X1A


8. In terms of equating "modest" degradation in terms of the change in altitude, both [redacted] emphasized that increasing the altitude 15 percent would result in the loss of only 7 1/2 percent resolution, or about one and one-half feet. A main factor in this equation is that at 85 n.m. most of the atmosphere is below the satellite so that the reduction in atmospheric attenuation in the next 15 n.m. is relatively insignificant.

25X1A


9. The Chairman, while accepting the reasoning, felt it important to afford members a chance to study all options and requested [redacted] to supply coverage figures at 85 n.m. Another way of estimating the satisfaction of requirements might be to weigh optimum resolution over 100,000 sq. n.m., for instance, as compared to a poorer scale and resolution for 150,000 sq. n.m.

25X1A

25X1D




Handling of SR-71 Photography of North Korea



25X1

11. The State Department member raised questions concerning the classification, handling, and release of photography to be acquired by the two SR-71 missions that have been authorized over North Korea. Mr. Moyer stated that the principal concern of the Department is to insure discrete and controlled handling in Washington, as originally specified for BLACK SHIELD in accordance with OPCEN 1818. He noted also that the President of South Korea has been advised of increased reconnaissance activity over North Korea and has expressed an interest in learning the results. Mr. Moyer speculated that the question of release of sanitized information and sanitized photography to the ROK will come up and, in accordance with actions initiated in January 1968 (COMIREX-D-4.17/3), will need to be referred to the Board for approval.





25X1A

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

TOP SECRET



25X1A
25X1A

25X1

25X1A
25X1
25X1

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0
COMIREX-M-74
26 June 1969

25X1A

12. There was general agreement among the COMIREX members that we should follow the same ground rules for classification and U.S. handling of SR-71 that were approved for BLACK SHIELD photography of North Korea.

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

13. [] reported that arrangements have been made for first-phase readout of the SR-71 photography to be handled by the 67th and for NPIC to do the second-phase readout.

[] reported that EXSUBCOM has established a first-phase target list and film distribution requirements and that a cable has been sent out advising the 67th that the material is to be classified SECRET NO FOREIGN.

14. The Chairman asked that COMIREX members notify his office if their agencies have any problems with following the procedures in OPCEN 1818 for SR-71 photography. He also asked [] to review the relationship between field dissemination and use of this material and its dissemination and use within the Washington area.

25X1A

Study of Near-Real-Time Imagery Satellite System: Its Impact on Intelligence Products and Processes

25X1

25X1A

25X1A

15. The Chairman advised that he proposes to distribute a draft statement of requirements for a near-real-time capability to COMIREX members within the next week or so for their review and comment. He emphasized that his office will handle this as a matter of priority, noting that the Executive Secretary, USIB, had designated early July as a deadline. [] volunteered that the deadline might have been set in anticipation of an ExCom meeting in July, but he now understood that 8 August has been set as the date for the meeting.

16. [] said that he aims to keep the paper relatively short and to deal with the requirement in somewhat general terms. He hopes that this paper will establish the principle that development of such a system as this demands the closest iteration between the NRO and COMIREX to insure a realistic and viable balance between requirements, technical problems, and engineering capabilities. This dialogue should also insure development of a system that is most effective in terms of cost.

20

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

TOP SECRET

25X1A

25X1

25X1A

25X1A

25X1

25X1A
25X1
25X1

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

COMIREX-M-74
26 June 1969

25X1A

25X1A

17. [redacted] urged that COMIREX members consider the following three documents as the basis for review and consideration of the draft he will be providing:

25X1A

a. COMIREX report to USIB, Requirements for Image Forming Satellite Reconnaissance Responsive to Warning/Indications Needs (USIB-D-46.4/3, COMIREX-D-13.7/4, [redacted]-0002-68, 5 January 1968);

25X1A

b. Memorandum for Chairman, USIB, from the Director, NRO, Study of Requirements for Image Forming Satellite Reconnaissance Responsive to Warning/Indications Needs, 12 March 1969 (Memorandum for Holders of USIB-D-46.4/3, 21 March 1969, [redacted]-0002-68/6); and

25X1A

c. CIA Study of a Near-Real-Time Imagery Satellite System: Its Impact on Intelligence Production and Processes (USIB-D-46.4/29, 16 June 1969, [redacted])

25X1A

18. [redacted]

25X1
NR

He did not feel that the state of the art is anywhere near being able to handle this problem at this time. The Chairman observed that consideration had been given to the problem [redacted]

25X1
NR

[redacted] This is an aspect which requires study. [redacted] concluded with a reference to ongoing work in the near-real-time field in the Pentagon and requested close coordination in drafting the paper.

25X1
NRO

25X1A


TOP SECRET

25X1A

25X1
25X1A
25X1A


25X1

25X1A
25X1



Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

TOP SECRET



COMIREX-M-74
26 June 1969

25X1
25X1A

Section V (Status of Recent COMIREX Papers)

Approval of FY 1970 Basic Requirements (COMIREX-D-31.4-70/1, COMIREX-D-31.4-70/2, COMIREX-D-31.4-70/3, COMIREX-D-31.4-70/4, COMIREX-D-31.4-70/5, and COMIREX-D-31.4-70/6) and Report on Progress in Program.



25X1

1. Following comment by the DIA member that most agencies concerned have been involved through their EXSUBCOM members in the preparation of the above listed COMIREX documents, COMIREX members agreed that the documents should be considered approved by COMIREX and forwarded to the appropriate components for action. A listing of the NTP Functional Areas thus approved for tasking follows:


<u>COMIREX Document Number</u>	<u>NTP Functional Area</u>	<u>Organization Responsible for Basic Reporting</u>
COMIREX-D-31.4-70/1	Missile Ranges: Strategic SSM and Space Facilities	NPIC
COMIREX-D-31.4-70/2	Non-Military Industries	NPIC /CIA (IAS)
COMIREX-D-31.4-70/3	Naval Launched Facilities	NPIC
COMIREX-D-31.4-70/4	Air Launched Facilities	NPIC
COMIREX-D-31.4-70/5	Deployed Strategic SSM Facilities	NPIC/ CIA (IAS)
COMIREX-D-31.4-70/6	Miscellaneous	NPIC

2. The Chairman, EXSUBCOM, distributed copies of a chart showing the progress of efforts to draw up a coordinated Basic Support Exploitation Program for FY 70. A copy is attached at Tab C.




25X1A

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0



TOP SECRET



25X1
25X1A
25X1A

25X1A

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

TOP SECRET

COMIREX-M-74
26 June 1969

25X1
25X1A

COMIREX Resource Information Report, Third Quarter FY 1969,
Program for Planning Exploitation FY 1971-1975
(COMIREX-D-31.5/3 and COMIREX-M-73, page 18, paragraph 3)

3. The Chairman noted that the resource information report had been in the hands of COMIREX members since approximately 19 April. He hoped therefore that it might be possible to agree to acceptance of this paper at this meeting. If not, [] requested that specific objections be sent to the COMIREX office so that they could be discussed at the next meeting. [] noted that in the elapsed time since distribution of the paper NPIC had recommended changes to be made on page 8 and page 19. Members studied the recommended changes and approved that the third-quarter resource information report be approved as amended by these changes. The changes are given below:

25X1

25X1A

25X1A

a. Page 8, Figure 6, add the following footnote:

"Unspecified areas means that manhours spent during this quarter have not yet been geographically attributed to reports which are in work. The geographic attribution can be made for completed reports only."

b. Page 19, paragraph 7 a. and b.: Delete the paragraphs.

25X1A

25X1

25X1


25X1A

25X1

25X1A


25X1

25X1



Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

TOP SECRET



COMIREX-M-74
26 June 1969

25X1A

Section VI (Other Business)

Comments From the Retiring Chairman



25X1

25X1A

1. [redacted] observed that he had requested an opportunity to address some final comments to COMIREX as he felt that what he wished to say could be more appropriately stated within the security of a COMIREX meeting than at Fort Myer.

25X1A

2. [redacted] noted that an outstanding feature of the growth and success of the clandestine reconnaissance program since 1954 has been the breadth and extent of the community participation. The retiring Chairman reminded COMIREX that other successful programs such as development of the A-bomb, the nuclear submarine, and the polaris missile had depended almost entirely on the efforts of such individuals as General Groves and Admiral Rickover. In contrast to the vertical axis and control of these efforts the reconnaissance effort had been horizontal.


3. Mr. Richard Bissell could properly be credited with having provided the impetus for the initial overhead reconnaissance program in the sophisticated guise of the U-2. If he had wished to do so, Mr. Bissell could have controlled this effort on the same vertical command plane as the others mentioned. Mr. Bissell opted, however, to take a horizontal route. He established the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee (ARC) under Mr. Reber and from that point on, even though with the appearance of photographic satellites the effort has grown enormously, the community has remained involved on this broad horizontal scale.

25X1A

4. [redacted] observed that it was a great personal satisfaction to him to realize that as a community effort reconnaissance has become a significant part of the intelligence culture. [redacted] felt that this aspect must be preserved and those now associated with COMIREX should insure that whether it be under the guise of security, policy, or something else, no element should be permitted to interfere with the present community effort and establish vertical command controls. [redacted] then paid particular tribute to Mr. Reber for

25X1A

25X1A





25X1A

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

TOP SECRET



25X1A
25X1A

25X1A
25X1

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

COMIREX-M-74
26 June 1969

25X1
25X1A

his early efforts to insure a community effort and concluded with the observation that a good evidence of the extent of the present community effort could be judged by the fact that he felt that his job could not have been done without all of those he now felt compelled to mention and to thank;

The NRO Staff which has worked hard and skillfully with us on the NRP; especially General Stewart, General Berg,

25X1A

25X1A

NPIC -

25X1A

25X1A

Security - [] and many others who have turned out to be extremely helpful in the whole effort.

Systems Analysis Staff - especially []

25X1A

Computer Services - [] who has given a lot of time to solving the unsolvable problems.

25X1A

OSP - perhaps especially [] because of the time she has devoted to irritating problems.

25X1A

The COMIREX Staff - not only those at the office at Langley but the Chairmen of all the subcommittees and working groups. These run the gamut of frustration, such as those encountered by [] trying to translate the JIIRG report into reality on the exploitation side; [] with the precarious responsibility of representing the mapping and charting community, and he still manages to take his frustrations with great good humor; and finally Colonel [] who has been uniquely responsible for the practical applications of research and development in the exploitation arena, including the achievement of visible savings by avoiding duplication.

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

25

25X1

25X1A

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

TOP SECRET

25X1A
25X1A

25X1

25X1A
25X1

[redacted] Approved For Release

TOP SECRET

Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

COMIREX-M-74
26 June 1969

25X1
25X1A

Sanitization of KH-4 for Contingency Planning (COMIREX-D-2.7/7)

25X1A

5. The DIA member advised COMIREX of the recent exchange of memoranda by Admiral Moorer, General Cushman, and Admiral Lowrance on the subject of sanitization of T-KH data for the operational forces. The need for expanded and expedited action on proposals currently before SDWG/COMIREX was emphasized. [redacted] also noted that the currently established procedures were reasonable and that we should attempt to work within them before any significant overhaul of the system is attempted.

25X1

25X1A

[redacted]

25X1A

[redacted]

Executive Secretary
Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation

Attachments
Tabs B & C

[redacted]

25X1A

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

TOP SECRET


25X1A
25X1A

25X1

High Resolution Coverage of North Vietnam

(80% or more cloud-free)

Date of Report: 25 June 1969 Tab B



25X1

25X1

25X1A

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040001-0